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THE ANTITRUST IMMUNITY DOCTRINE AND
UNITED STATES v. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF SECURITIES DEALERS: STEPPING
ON OTTER TAIL
That yesterday's abuse of free trade gave rise to today's broad

network of antitrust legislation' is a matter of common knowledge.
Certainly no extensive discussion is required here, therefore, to support
the statement that "the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national

Courts3 and commentators4 alike recognize that
economic policy."
despite "the tense interplay of differing and at times conflicting public

policies," 5 the current amalgamation-conglomeration juggernaut by
which corporate power has become so concentrated serves only to re-

affirm "the felt indispensible role of antitrust policy in the maintenance
of a free economy ... "
1. Because the cases pertinent to this analysis are largely confined to alleged
violations of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974)) and Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974)) these
two statutes in particular, apart from the general body of federal antitrust legislation,
will be of exclusive concern herein.
2. Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963);
Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 324 (1963) (the Sherman
Act "embodies perhaps the most basic economic policy of our society").
4. See, e.g., SEcnoN OF ANTrrRUST LAW OF THE AMmRicAN BAR AssocLTioN,
ANTrrmusT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 189 (1968); Johnson, Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Orrick, The Recent Erosion of Certain Antitrust Exemptions, 10 ANnmusT BULL. 667 (1965); Pogue, The
Rationale of Exemptions from the Antitrust Laws, 19 ABA ANTrUST SEcroN 313
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Pogue]; Comment, Antitrust Immunity of the National
Association of Securities Dealers Under the Maloney Act, 14 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L.
REV. 111 (1972); Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State Action Exemptions, 24 HAsTiNGs L.J. 287 (1973); Note, Antitrust Laws and the Securities
Exchanges, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 100 (1971); Comment, An Approach for Reconciling
Antitrust Law and Securities Law: The Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 260 (1970); Note, The New York Stock Exchange
Minimum Commission Rate Structure: Antitrust on Wall Street, 55 VA. L. Rv. 661
(1969); Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 10 WM.
& MARY L. Rav. 136 (1968).
5. United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 735
(1975) (White, J., dissenting).
6. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).
[387]
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Accordingly, the parameters of express and implied immunity
from that policy may have been most conservatively drawn by a remarkably consistent line of Supreme Court decisions. 7 It has become axiomatic, for example, that both express and implied exemptions are
strongly disfavored.' Indeed, this disfavor is so virulent that express
immunity is subject to rigorously narrow construction, 9 and implied
immunity is granted solely upon a strong showing of either "pervasiveness" in the particular regulatory scheme on the one hand, or "the necessity of antitrust repeal to make the regulatory scheme work," on the
other.' 0
Such was the unquestionably well-established immunity standard
prior to the recent decision of United States v. National Association of
Securities Dealers.1 For nearly three decades the Court has adamantly refused, with one exception, 1 2 to grant antitrust immunity to any
of the numerous regulated industries with which it has dealt. Nonethe7. The Supreme Court cases will be discussed throughout this
lower court treatment of the immunity issue is to be found in Kaplan
250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), ajf'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.),
U.S. 954 (1967); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., (E.D.

note. Significant
v. Lehman Bros.,
cert. denied, 389
Wis. 1969). See
also Note, Antitrust Laws and the Securities Exchanges, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 100 (1971);
Note, Securities Law, 36 OHio ST. L.J. 145 (1975).
8. This disfavor, of course, is grounded upon traditional canons of statutory construction and upon the strong public policy in favor of antitrust enforcement. Thus,
"[lt is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored."
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939); accord, United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975); Gordon v. New York
Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines,
Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,
372 (1973); Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 303 (1973); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482,
485 (1962); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 456 (1945).
9. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726
(1973).
10. Both "pervasiveness" and "necessity of repeal" are terms of art in the context
of implied immunity. Although necessarily cryptic at this point, both terms will ultimately be deciphered.
11. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
12. Industries regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Act have been exempted. For
examples of the Court's refusal to exempt other regulated industries, see Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973) (1916 Shipping Act); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (Federal Power Act); Ricci
v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973) (Commodities Exchange Act);
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Bank Merger Act);
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (Securities Exchange Act); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (Natural Gas Act); Maryland
& Va. Milk Producer's Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960) (Capper-Volstead Act); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (Interstate Commerce
Act).
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less, a majority of five justices in NASD flatly exempted mutual funds
exchanges from antitrust suit for both price-fixing and collective refusals to deal. On the basis of little more than its finding that mutual
fund self-regulation is governed by a public interest standard under the
administrative aegis of the Securities Exchange Commission and that
the activities under attack had never been expressly disapproved by
that agency, the NASD majority concluded that the regulatory scheme
was sufficiently "pervasive" to imply a congressional intent to grant
antitrust immunity, and that immunity was "necessary" to the operation
of the mutual funds industry.
Until the NASD holding the Supreme Court had without exception
expressly rejected the public interest standard as sufficient to confer
antitrust immunity upon self-regulated industries, and had flatly refused
to accord deferential weight to prior administrative approval of anticompetitive practices. By virtue of its radical departure from this formidably cohesive body of case law, the NASD decision clearly poses the
question whether it represents a narrow exception to, a complete abrogation of, or a perverse distortion in the traditional antitrust immunity
doctrine. This note will attempt to demonstrate that the third alternative is in fact the most accurate answer. It will do so first by examining the traditional immunity standard as it has evolved in earlier case
law, and then by systematically analyzing the shortcomings of the
NASD majority's attempt to establish that the self-regulatory scheme
of the mutual funds industry meets that standard's well-defined criteria.
The Express Immunity Standard
"Express immunity" means no more than that Congress has integrated into given regulatory legislation a clause expressly insulating the
industry in question from liability under the antitrust laws for activity
undertaken pursuant to statutory mandate. Numerous express exemptions exist by which activity otherwise illegal per se'3 is permitted for
purposes of effectuating any number of regulatory objectives. 1 4 The
courts insist, however, that such legislative waiver be unambiguous. 15
13. Per se violations of the Sherman Act, for example, include price-fixing, collective refusals to deal (group boycotts), market allocations, and tying arrangements.
See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
14. Illustrative of legislation expressly granting immunity from the operation of
the antitrust laws are 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970) (Capper-Volstead exemption for agricultural co-operatives); 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1970) (McCarran-Fergson exemption for
state regulation of insurance); 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1970) (Webb-Pomerance exemption
for export trade associations); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) (exempting labor, agricultural
and horticultural associations); 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1970) (exempting state supervision of resale price maintenance).
15. See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Hughes
Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
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The judicial function in enforcing the Sherman and Clayton Acts is preempted where Congress itself has weighed competing regulatory and
antitrust interests and has deliberately chosen to subordinate the latter
to the former. Public policy having been clearly determined by the
legislature, the judiciary properly stays its hand.'"
It is, however, the rare statute that is sufficiently clear to qualify
as an express exemption. And it is those cases requiring construction
of an ambiguous, albeit arguably express, statutory exemption which
best exemplify the concept of regulatory exemption. In such cases the
strong judicial distaste for the express exemption doctrine is particularly
manifest, and the statutory language of exemption is uniformly subjected to rigouously narrow construction. A brief overview of the cases
in which express
exemptions have been asserted will suffice by way
17
of illustration.
United States v. Borden Co.'" arose out of a claimed exemption
from charges of violating section 1 of the Sherman Act 9 for conspiracy
to fix the retail price and restrict the supply of milk in Chicago. Immunity was claimed on the basis of the express statutory exemption
embodied in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act20 which empowered the secretary of agriculture to fix commodity price levels by
authorizing marketing agreements. In overruling the lower court's
grant of immunity the Supreme Court declared that the limited statutory exemption of agency initiated agreements could not be construed
to create "so great a breach in historic remedies and sanctions" as to
likewise exempt agreements among purely private associations. 2 ' The
fact that the exemptive provision of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act was not coterminous with the Sherman Act was held to be
fatal:
These explicit provisions requiring official participation and authorizations show beyond question how far Congress intended that the
Agricultural Act should operate to render the Sherman Act inapplicable. If Congress had desired to grant
any further immunity,
22
Congress doubtless would have said So.
16. See generally Pogue, supra note 4. See also United States v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 735 (1975).
17. In addition to the cases discussed in the succeeding text, see United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956). Interpreting the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts, the Court said: "Congress has marked the limitations beyond which price
fixing cannot go. We are not only bound by those limitations but we are bound to

construe them strictly, since resale price maintenance is a privilege restrictive of a free
economy". Id. at 316.
18. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).

20. 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1973).
21. 308 U.S. at 198.
22. Id. at 201.
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Some years later, in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,2 3 suit
was filed alleging a private conspiracy to fix discriminatory, arbitrary,
and noncompetitive rates by means of the general rate-setting procedure of the Interstate Commerce Act.24 In granting plaintiffs' prayer
for an injunction against defendants' rate-fixing activity, the Court rejected the claim that antitrust shelter lay in the express exemption
clause of section 16 of the Clayton Act, which provides that no injunction shall issue against a carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act25 "in respect of any matter subject to the . . . jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. '26 Section 16 of the Clayton Act
was inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Interstate Commerce Commission in fact had no jurisdiction over the subject matter for which
injunctive relief was sought:
Georgia . . . is not seeking an injunction against the continuance of any tariff; nor does she seek to have any tariff provision cancelled. She merely asks that the alleged rate-fixing
combination and conspiracy among the defendant-carriers be enjoined ....
What is a matter over which the Commission has
27
no jurisdiction.
Second, while section 11 of the Clayton Act2 8 authorizes the ICC
to immunize mergers and consolidationsfrom antitrust attack, it grants
no such power with respect to rate-fixing combinations:
[W]e find no warrant in the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act for saying that the authority to fix joint through rates
clothes with legality a conspiracy to discriminate against a State or
a region, to use coercion in fixing the rates, or to put in the hands
of a combination
of carriers a veto power over rates proposed by
29
a single carrier.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association, Inc. v. United
States3 0 involved a similar claim of both express and implied immunity
from a civil antitrust attack launched under sections 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act 3 and section 7 of the Clayton Act3 2 for attempted monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize, and illegal acquisition of a competing
independent producer. The express grant of antitrust shelter was first
claimed to exist in section 6 of the Clayton Act, which exempts agricultural organizations from antitrust liability as illegal combinations or con23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

324 U.. 439 (1945).
The rate setting procedure isauthorized by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4), 6 (1970).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970 & Supp. IV,1974).
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970) (emphasis added).
324 U.S. at 455.
15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
324 .U.S. at 458.
362 U.S. 453 (1960).
I5U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (1970&Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 18 (1970).
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spiracies in restraint of trade. 33 After reviewing the legislative history
of section 6 and emphasizing that the purpose of the provision was
solely to promote farmers' cooperatives by insulating their organization
from state antitrust attack,34 the Court declared that while under the
statute "an association cannot be restrained 'from lawfully carrying out
the legitimate objects thereof [such as cooperative transportation and
equipment purchasing arrangements] . . . the section cannot support
the contention that it gives such an entity full freedom to engage in
predatory trade practices at will." 35
The defendant next asserted that section 7 of the Clayton Act expressly exempted the illegal agreements as "transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by. . .the Secretary of Agriculture
under any statutory provision vesting such power in such. . .Secretary
.
. ,"I' Rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out that the sec37
retary's authority was confined to approving marketing agreements,
and stated that the acquisition of an independent producer therefore
could not be construed to be within the ambit of section 7's limited
reach. 8
In California v. Federal Power Commission, 9 the Court also narrowly construed section 7 of the Clayton Act with respect to transactions
"consummated pursuant to the authority given by the . . . Federal
Power Commission . . . under any statutory provision vesting such
power in such Commission .
*....
0 The clause was held to provide
no defense to a suit alleging illegal acquisition of stock pursuant to the
merger of defendant pipeline companies. The fact that the acquisition
of assets had been authorized by the Federal Power Commission pursuant to the Natural Gas Act4 1 was held insufficient to bring the merger
within the exemptive purview of section 7 of the Clayton Act. FPC
statutory jurisdiction, the Court said, was confined to transactions involving the acquisition of assets of natural gas companies4 2 and could
not therefore be construed to insulate defendants from a Clayton Act
33. Id. § 17. The claim of implied immunity based on the Capper-Volstead Act,
7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1970), was rejected on the same grounds as in United States v.
Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
34. 362 U.S. at 464.
35. Id. at 465-66 (emphasis added).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
37. See Agricultural Adjustment Act § 8b, 7 U.S.C. § 608b (1973).
38. 362 U.S. at 470. See also California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S.
482, 484-85 (1962); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-202 (1939).
39. 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
41. Id. § 717f(c).
42. Id.
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suit attacking their illegal acquisition of stock.43
Cases in the realm of antitrust exemption may also straddle an
inevitably esoteric line between exemptions ambiguously express and
exemptions merely implied. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
United States" is one such case. The immunity ultimately granted
defendant air carriers from charges of division of territories and allocations of routes in violation of the Sherman Act4 5 was implied rather than
express. 4 6 Nonetheless, the circumspect language of the Court is noteworthy in the context of express exemptions.
The Court emphasized that limitations of routes and division of
territories were "precise ingredients" of the Civil Aeronautics Board's
general authority under the Federal Aviation Act4 7 to approve or deny
air carrier certificates and were therefore essential to the regulatory
scheme. While granting that a limited repeal of the antitrust laws was
therefore implicitly necessary, 48 the Court made it clear that its holding
nonetheless reserved for the courts enforcement of antitrust standards
as to at least part of the airlines industry:
[W]e hesitate here . . . to hold that the new regulatory scheme
adopted in 1938 was designed completely to displace the antitrust
laws-absent an unequivocally declared congressional purpose so
to do. While the [Civil Aeronautics] Board is empowered to deal
with numerous aspects of what are normally thought of as antitrust
problems, those expressly entrusted to it encompass only a fraction
of the total. Apart from orders which give immunity from the antitrust laws by reason of § 414, the whole criminal law enforcement
problem remains unaffected by the Act. Moreover, on the civil
side violations of antitrust laws other than those enumerated in the
Act might be imagined. We, therefore, refuse to hold that there
antitrust violations left to the Department of Justice to
are no 49
enforce.
This question of the scope of CAB exemptive jurisdiction was
again raised in Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,5" some
43. 369 U.S. at 489. For a discussion of this case in the context of implied immunity, see text accompanying notes 107-13 infra.

44. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
46. Because the Pan American grant of immunity was based upon an implied exemption rationale, the case is most significant in the area of implied immunity. See
text accompanying notes 77-87 infra.
47. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974), formerly Civil Aeronautics
Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 573 (1938).
48. No detailed discussion of the implied exemption principle applied in Pan
American will be undertaken at this point. Suffice it to say that antitrust repeal was
indicated to the extent that the conflicting regulation was essential to the regulatory
scheme as a whole. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 'U.S. 341 (1963).
49. 371 U.S. at 304-05 (1963) (citations omitted).
50. 409 U.S. 383 (1973).
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ten years after Pan American. Unlike Pan American, however, the
case represents one of the distinctly rare grants of express statutory
immunity, 51 and the holding was specifically predicated upon construction of the exemptive provision of section 414 of the Civil Aeronauticqs
52
Act.
Trans World Airlines' treble damages action against defendant
Toolco alleged that Toolco had used its controlling interest in TWA to
manipulate TWA's purchase and financing of aircraft equipment to
TWA's competitive disadvantage. Rejecting the claim that defendant's
actions were vulnerable to attack under the Sherman Act, the Court
pointed out (1) that Toolco's initial de facto control of TWA had been
approved by the CAB in 1944 pursuant to section 408 of the Civil
Aeronautics Act, which specifically governed consolidations, mergers,
and acquisition of control over air carriers;5 3 (2) that the 1944 approval
had narrowly limited subsequent intercompany sales to those specifically
approved by the CAB; (3) that all such sales of aircraft had in fact received the requisite approval; and (4) that having been duly approved,
the transactions were expressly immunized from antitrust attack by virtue of section 414 of the act. While the Hughes Court viewed sections
408 and 414 in tandem as an unequivocally express statutory exemption
clearly dispositive of the antitrust issue,5 4 it nonetheless felt compelled
to repeat its Pan American caveat that the exemption power of the CAB
is strictly limited by statute and therefore subject to narrow construc-

tion.

55

Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.5 6 is perhaps
the most significant case to consider in the context of express exemp51. See also Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
52. 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970) provides that any carriers acting pursuant to CAB
approval under sections 408, 409, 411 and 412 of the Civil Aeronautics Act are relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws, including the Sherman Act.
53. Id. § 1378 (1970).
54. But note Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which criticized the Court's' grant of
immunity. The grant was based on section 408, which gave the CAB broad authority
over air transportation. Burger maintained that the defendant's conduct alleged monopolization of aircraftsales and fell outside the ambit of section 408.
55. 409 U.S. at 387. With respect to strict judicial construction of express exemptions, the Hughes opinion is straightforward enough on its face. But the Court cited
Pan American along with section 414 as a ground of decision. Id. at 385. This clearly
indicates that Hughes involved some of the standard of agency review problems that
afflict the implied exemption area. This is true because section 408 approval, albeit
expressly exemptive, is nonetheless predicated upon a standard of review which is not
necessarily pervasive, the "public interest" as defined by section 102. Id. Thus, while
the transactions in Hughes were unquestionably within the exemptive ambit of sections
408 and 414 as a matter of strict construction, the review standard upon which section
408 is based may not be sufficiently pervasive to justify section 414's expressly exemptive effect.
56. 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
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tions; the decision is relatively recent, and arguably represents the most
extreme application of the narrow construction doctrine to date. Exemption was claimed on the basis of section 15 of the 1916 Shipping
Act, which expressly insulates from antitrust attack seven categories of
agreements between shippers when approved by the Federal Maritime
Commission. Two of the categories include agreements "(3) controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition . . ." and "(7)
in any manner providing
for an exclusive, preferential, or cooperative
57
working arrangement.
The Court held that defendant Oceanic Steamship Co.'s purchase
of defendant Pacific Far East Lines' entire fleet was not an agreement
immune from Clayton Act 8 liability by virtue of the third categorical
exemption, despite commission approval. Scrutinizing the statutory
language of section 15, the Court first pointed out that all seven exemptive categories involved agreements which were ongoing in nature,
requiring continuous commission supervision. Because none of the
seven categories expressly referred to discrete, one-time merger or
acquisition of assets agreements, the Court concluded that defendants'
transaction was outside the section 15 exemptive ambit. 59 This interpretation was further supported by the ejusdem generis canon of construction: "catchall" statutory provisions must be construed as summarizing the type of agreements covered by the statute in general. Because the seventh exemption was expressly limited to working arrangements, it excluded discrete merger agreements as a matter of
construction.
It is significant, however, that the Court in Seatrain discussed both
the c6nstruction and legislative history60 of the statute merely as a bolster for the more important rationale underlying its denial of an express
exemption:
Without more [than the Commission's contention that the disputed
agreements were within the ambit of the third categorial exemp57. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970 &Supp. IV, 1974).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
59. 411 U.S. at 730.
60. The Court pursued a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the Shipping Act and concluded that discrete mergers and acquisitions of assets were not within
the purview of the commission for three reasons. First, at the time the act was passed
the commission was required to approve, without consideration of adverse empirical effects, merger agreements which simply met given statutory criteria. Second, the word
"agreements" was a term of art which did not embrace agreements not requiring ongoing
commission rights and obligations. Third, congressional intent to require approval of
mergers and acquisitions has been unambiguous in other contexts, such as the Interstate
Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (a) (i)(1970)), the Federal Communication Act (47
U.S.C. § 222(b)(1) (1970)), and especially the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. §
1382(a) (1970)), after which the Shipping Act was modelled. 411 U.S. 726, 736-

44 (1973).
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tion], we might be inclined to agree that many merger agreements
probably fit within this category. But a broad reading of the third
category would conflict with our frequently expressed view that
exemptions from antitrust laws are strictly construed . . . . This
principle has led us to construe the Shipping Act as conferring only
a "limited antitrust exemption" in light of the fact that "antitrust
laws represent a fundamental national policy." 61

Thus, while the NASD decision itself involves no express exemptive, clause, 62 it is clear from the foregoing discussion that it does deal
with what has come to be regarded as a very "fundamental national
policy," and that the responsibility for safeguarding that policy against
the inroads of piecemeal federal regulation of industry is one which
the Court to date has taken most seriously indeed. The impact of the
express exemption cases cannot be overestimated; so basic are the
public policy principles embodied in the antitrust laws that the Court
has consistently sought to preserve their vitality and to prevent their
haphazard legislative abrogation. The Supreme Court's position with
respect to implied exemptions, moreover, has been even more adamant.
The Implied Inununity Standard
Claims of congressional repeal of the antitrust laws have not been
made exclusively upon expressly exemptive statutes. Indeed, immunity from the antitrust laws has been sought far more frequently under
the implied doctrine. 63 The theoretical foundation of this doctrine is
a simple one. It is very generally the function of federal regulatory
61. 411 U.S. at 732-33, citing Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference,
383 U.S. 213, 218-19 (1966). See also United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 735 (1975) (Vhite, J.,dissenting); United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
62. The reader familiar with the Maloney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970), will
recall the language of section 78o-3(n): "If any provision of this section is in conflict
with any provision of any law of the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the
provision of this section shall prevail." This section occasionally has been interpreted
as an express exemption from the antitrust laws. See International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 809 n.16 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940); National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 478 n.9 (1945). Compare Note, The New York Stock
Exchange Minimum Commission Rate Structure: Antitrust on Wall Street, 55 VA. L.
REv. 661, 682-83 (1969), with Note, Antitrust Immunity of the NASD Under the
Maloney Act, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 111 (1972) (concluding that any express
exemption is limited to section 78o-3(i)). But the Court in NASD did not rely upon
the provision, and chose, rather, to base the holding upon an implied immunity theory.
63. It may be argued that implied immunity should not be elevated to the status
of a "doctrine": only two cases, Pan American and NASD, have granted immunity
on that basis. However, because implied immunity has become a major ground for
defending Sherman and Clayton Act suits and because of the likelihood of future cases
dealing with the concept, this note treats it as a disfavored but established doctrine
of antitrust law.
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agencies either passively to oversee those industries which Congress
elected to make self-regulatory or actively to police those in which selfregulation has been deemed not feasible.6 4 While any number of legiti-

mate economic and public policy considerations underlie Congress'
differentiating such regulatory schemes, it is obvious that agency regulation of either type inevitably impinges to some extent upon the free
competition principle embodied in the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Implicit, therefore, in the passage of regulatory legislation may be a
congressional intent to repeal the antitrust laws at least to the extent
necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme. 65
Pristine theory is, of course, notoriously difficult to apply in practice. It is clear from the express exemption cases that the strong policy
in favor of antitrust enforcement weighs heavily in the balance. In

practical application, therefore, the Court's exclusive criteria for implying a congressional intent to subordinate that policy to a given conflicting regulatory policy have been but two: (1) the regulatory scheme
must be so pervasive as to imply congressional intent to create an
administrative substitute for antitrust enforcement;6 6 or (2) the given
64. Public utilities and transportation are examples of industries governed by active regulatory schemes; passively regulated industries include securities, banking, and
agriculture. It would be premature at this point to analyze the implications of these
two types of schemes with respect to implied immunity. See text accompanying note
211 infra. Suffice it to note here that active regulatory schemes are designed to police
naturally monopolistic industries which demand a high degree of governmental control
and preclude self-regulation as a safeguard against market abuse. See generally Hale
& Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. Rnv. 46, 53-56 (1962); Note, An Approach for Reconciling
Antitrust Law and Securities Law: The Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry
Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U.L. Rav. 260, 339 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Reconciling Antitrust Law].
65. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
66. This criterion must not be confused with the altogether different question of
whether a given agency has been granted primary jurisdiction over antitrust matters.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires certain initial factual determinations by
the agency and may result in an administrative judgment. Such a judgment may either
have "considerable weight" or simply "make a meaningful contribution" when the issue
is ultimately tried to a court of law. Compare United States v. National Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975), with Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409
U.S. 289, 307 (1973). The doctrine merely delays the ultimate judicial determination
of antitrust issues; it by no means preempts it. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch.,
409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 346 n.14 (1959); Federal
Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498 (1958); Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (classic treatment of the primary jurisdiction issue).
When satisfied, the criterion of pervasiveness on the other hand means that agency jurisdiction over antitrust violations is exclusive because it is sufficiently comprehensive to
equal the jurisdiction and remedial power of the courts under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
A defendant's invocation of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, then, is clearly
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regulation must be so necessary to the objectives of the regulatory
scheme as a whole as to imply that Congress intended to repeal the
antitrust laws to the extent that their application would frustrate the
general regulatory purpose.
Both pervasiveness and necessity perhaps initially appear to be
little more than judicial epithets in search of utilitarian definitions. As
will become apparent, however, pre-NASD case law had refined and
consistently applied quite workable definitions. Only by analyzing the
case law can one discover the precise juridical meanings of both pervasiveness and necessity6 7 -concepts which appear to have been recently redefined in the NASD case. Nor can such an analysis be said
to be a question of mere semantics; a far more readily implied repeal
of the antitrust laws hangs in the balance.
Regulation of Communications
Among the first decisions of the Court to address the problem of
implied immunity was United States v. RCA. 6 8 Charged with having
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act6 9 by virtue of an exchange of
stations pursuant to a conspiracy to monopolize commercial broadcasting, RCA claimed implied immunity on the ground that the transaction
had been approved by the Federal Communications Commission. FCC
approval of station acquisitions is mandatory under section 310(b) of
the Communications Act of 1934,70 which provides that license applications must be administratively reviewed by the statutory standard of
"public interest, convenience, and necessity."'1 RCA's assertions were
that by virtue of section 310(b), the FCC had the authority to pass on
antitrust issues, and that the regulatory scheme of the Federal Communications Act was therefore sufficiently pervasive to displace the
Sherman Act.
RCA's defense was rejected on three grounds. The Court first
pointed out that neither the statute nor its legislative history indicated
a congressional intent to vest in the FCC exclusive power to pass on
more innocuous in its public policy effect than a 'claim of regulation sufficiently
pervasive to preclude judicial application of the antitrust laws.
67. A methodological caveat is appropriate at this point. The analyses of the
implied immunity cases will be somewhat unorthodox to the extent that they will focus
solely upon the existence of certain agency powers to regulate competition in the industry in question. This purely functional approach is purposefully taken as the best means
by which to isolate those discrete factors required for a finding of pervasiveness or
necessity. See "Summary: The Evolved Immunity Standard," infra.
68. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1970).
71. Id.
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antitrust matters. Indeed, the fact that section 311 of the act was
amended in 1927 merely to authorize rather than to require denial of
a license to an applicant found to be in violation of the antitrust laws
was held to have been an indication of congressional intent to leave
antitrust enforcement wholly within the judicial realm.7" Second, while
section 153(h) of the Communications Act7 3 defined telephone and
telegraph companies as rate-related common carriers expressly exempted from antitrust attack, neither radio nor television broadcasters
were similarly defined. The broadcasting industry, the Court concluded, was thus congressionally denominated one of free competition,
and as such clearly remained subject to the antitrust laws. 74
Third and perhaps most significant, the Court emphasized that
mere agency approval which is limited to a statutory standard of "public
interest, convenience, and necessity" is no criterion for either express
immunity or implied immunity on a theory of pervasiveness in the
regulatory scheme:
[RCA], like unregulated business concerns, made a business
judgment as to the desirability of the exchange. Like unregulated
concerns, they had to make this judgment with knowledge that the
exchange might run afoul of the antitrust laws. Their decision
varied from that of an unregulated concern only in that they also
had to obtain the approval of a federal agency. But [the] scope
of that approval in the case of [the] FCC was limited to the statutory standard, public interest, convenience, and necessity.... No
pervasive regulatory scheme was involved. .... 75
[A] Commission determination of "public interest", convenience and necessity" cannot either constitute a binding adjudication
upon any antitrust issues . .
76.or serve to exempt a licensee pro
tanto from the antitrust laws.
Regulation of Transportation
This emphasis upon the standard of agency review became more
pointed in subsequent implied immunity cases and indeed ultimately
evolved as perhaps the foremost criterion of pervasiveness itself. The
holding in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,77 for
example, which represents the Court's singular grant of immunity on
the basis of pervasive industrial regulation, was grounded in large part
upon the fact that Clayton Act review and remedies were an integral
72. 358 U.S. at 343.
73. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
74. 358 U.S. at 349-50. See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 221(a), 222(c) (1) (1970 & Supp.
IV, 1974).
75. 358 U.S. at 350-51.
76. Id. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973). But see United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,

Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
77. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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part of the regulatory scheme of the Federal Aviation Act of 19 5 8 .11

Quite beyond the fact that the Aviation Act's legislative history clearly

reveals a congressional intent to circumscribe industry competition for
the sake of passenger safety, 79 it also provides for a sui generis antitrust standard for mandatory CAB certification,8 independent CAB investigative and exemptive power,8 ' and statutory authority to impose
82
Clayton Act sanctions upon the industry.
In contrast to the very general public interest standard of the communications industry and the nonexistent remedial powers of the
FCC,83 the airlines industry is under the jurisdiction of an agency
with both the statutory duty 84 and power85 independently to enforce the
antitrust laws. Because judicial antitrust scrutiny would therefore

clearly conflict with CAB authority under the regulatory scheme of the
Federal Aviation Act,8 6 congressional intent to insulate air carriers from

antitrust attack could reasonably be implied, and immunity was accord-

7
ingly granted to defendant Pan American.8

78. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
79. "Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme, which tends
to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers and to jeopardize and render unsafe
a transportation service appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the public
interest, in the interests of the Postal Service, and of the national defense." S. RF-.
No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938).
80. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970). The Court, however, found the standard analogous
to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for purposes of interpretation. 371
U.S. at 303.
81. Under sections 408-09 and 412 of the act, for example, the board has the
power to approve mergers, acquisitions, and pooling arrangements; under section 411
it has the power to investigate and to proscribe unfair trade practices; and under section
414 it may expressly exempt approved transactions from Clayton Act proceedings.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
83. See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
84. "The Board in regulating air carriers is to deal with at least some antitrust
problems." Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
85. See note 81 supra.
86. "If the courts were to intrude independently with their construction of the
antitrust laws, two regimes might collide." 371 U.S. at 310. This, of course, applies
only in the first instance; agency determinations are subject to appellate review.
87. It should be noted, however, that the pervasive regulatory scheme of the FAA
may have its gaps, despite the holding in Pan American. As the dissent points out,
while the exemptive provision of section 414 is expressly applicable to CAB orders under
sections 408-09 and 412, it does not apply to section 411 orders which were at issue
in the case. Moreover, the exemptive provision does not in any case immunize the
industry from attack under the Sherman Act, although it protects the industry from
the Clayton Act. Whether such regulation can be said to be so pervasive that it precludes concurrent antitrust jurisdiction to entertain suits for Sherman Act violations is
clearly open to question. It suffices for these purposes, however, simply to note that
Pan American represents the sole grant of implied immunity by the Court prior to
NASD, and it would appear to have based pervasiveness both upon an avowed legislative
intent to create a police rather than a self-regulatory scheme and upon a concommitant
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Securities and Commodities Exchange Regulation

While the Court thus held the airlines industry to be pervasively regulated and therefore exempt from antitrust suit, it emphatically ruled that the securities industry enjoyed no such immunity.
Indeed, in the landmark case of Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,s
the Court articulated the definitive test by which that industry would fail
to pass exemptive muster. Silver arose under the Securities Exchange
Act of 19349 and concerned the complaint of a nonmember brokerdealer that an SEC rule permitting summary severance of telephone connections between outsiders and members of the exchange constituted
a conspiracy and a collective refusal to deal in violations of sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. ° Given that the severance rule was
admittedly within the ambit of SEC authority to govern the exchange, 91
the issue was squarely presented whether the scheme of exchange selfregulation under the SEC was so pervasive as to preclude antitrust

attack.
The Court's holding that an antitrust action was proper was based
upon a dual rationale. First, the Court declared that immunity would
be implied "only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act
work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."9 2 This
criterion was to be "the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two

statutory schemes." 93 By thus couching the rule in terms of necessity,

the Supreme Court in Silver declared that nothing short of complete
statutory mandate for the comprehensive agency review necessary to implement the
scheme.
See also Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966),
which arose under the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970 & Supp. IV,
1974). In Carnation the defendants contended that rate agreements which had not
been approved by the Federal Maritime Commission were nonetheless immunized from
antitrust attack merely because the statute vested the agency with approval authority;
the unexercised power to approve was claimed to constitute pervasive regulation. The
Court rejected this argument and stated: "We have long recognized that the antitrust
laws represent a fundamental national economic policy, and have therefore concluded
that we cannot lightly assume that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for
particular aspects of an industry was intended to render the more general provisions
of the antitrust laws wholly inapplicable to that industry. We have therefore declined
to construe special industrial regulations as an implied repeal of the antitrust laws even
when the regulatory statute did not contain an accommodation provision ... ." Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218 (1966) (emphasis added).
See also Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (approval of rail
rates by ICC did not bar suit for illegal combination to fix rates).
88. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
90. Id. §§ 1-2.
91. 373 U.S. at 355-56.
92. Id. at 357.
93. Id.
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incompatibility between regulatory objectives and judicial antitrust enforcement could justify the subordination of antitrust to regulatory
policy. 4 Emphasizing that due process anteseverence notice and an
opportunity to be heard could .hardly be said to frustrate either the
objectives or operation of the 1934 act, the Court denied immunity on
the ground that the defendants' purported exemption failed to pass its
newly articulated necessity test.
Second, the Court held that the regulatory scheme of the act was
not so pervasive under established criteriaO9 5 as to alternatively justify
immunity. In keeping with congressional intent to keep the security
exchanges self-regulatory, 9 6 the general authority of the SEC to approve exchange rules is passive in practice97 and does not extend to
the review of their specific application. This lack of opportunity for
agency review according to antitrust standards was declared fatal to
defendants' claim of pervasiveness:
There is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs
the antitrust function of insuring that an exchange will not . . .
apply its rules so as to do injury to competition which cannot be
justified as furthering legitimate self-regulative ends. ...
Should
review of exchange self-regulation be provided through a vehicle
other than the antitrust laws, a different case as to antitrust exemption would be presented. 98
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange99 presented the Court with
just such a different case. At issue was whether transfer of plaintiff's
membership into the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, allegedly in violation of both exchange rules and the Commodity Exchange Act, 10 0 was
insulated from civil antitrust proceedings because rules violations were
within the mandatory adjudicative and remedial jurisdiction of the
Commodity Exchange Commission. 1 1 The pith of the Court's decision
was that the antitrust action should merely be stayed pending an administrative factual determination of whether the rules of the exchange
94. "The issue is only that of the extent to which the character and objectives
of the duty of exchange self-regulation contemplated by the Securities Exchange Act
are incompatible with the maintenance of an antitrust action." Id. at 358.
95. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
96. Congressional intent was apparently not to create a public utilities type participatory scheme. See notes 64 supra & 211 infra; Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws
to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J. 536 (1966); Reconciling Antitrust Law, supra
note 64.
97. Reconciling Antitrust Law, supra note 64, at 294-97. But see Rules of the
New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941) (multiple trading case).
98. 373 U.S. at 358, 360.
99. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
100. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
101. 17 C.F.R. § 0.53(c) (1974).
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had actually been violated., °2 Whatever the outcome of that particular
hearing, however, the ultimate issue of whether the antitrust laws would
in fact be enforced could only be judicially resolved. Because no antitrust considerations were mandated in.Commodity Exchange Commission proceedings, 10 3 pervasiveness in the self-regulatory scheme of the
commodities exchange industry was explicitly rejected. 10 4
Applying the lessons of Ricci to the criteria of Silver thus yields
three conclusions: (1) Self-regulation in the securities and commodities exchanges does not give rise to an inference of congressional intent
to immunize those industries in general; 10

5

(2) a statutory grant of

administrative jurisdiction over an industry is not, ipso facto, incompatible with the maintenance of an antitrust action; and (3) regulatory
schemes which do not embrace an antitrust standard cannot be said to
be pervasive. 6
Utilities Regulation
California v. Federal Power Commission 0 7 contributed yet
another criterion to the pervasiveness test. Denying that even this traditionally highly regulated industry0 s could lay claim to antitrust immunity, the Court cited the fact that FPC administration was governed by
a "public convenience and necessity" standard rather than an antitrust
102. Such a stay represents a classic exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
as properly applied in the antitrust immunity context. See note 66 supra.
103. The commission's review of exchange activity is governed only by a "conformity with exchange rules" standard. 7 U.S.C. §§ 8(a), 13 (a) (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
104. "Nor do we find that Congress intended the Act to confer general antitrust
immunity on the Exchange and its members with respect to that area of conduct within
the adjudicative or rule-making authority of the Commission or the Secretary. The
Act contains no categorical exemption of this kind; indeed, it confers no express exemption at all, not even with respect to conduct that is directed or authorized by the Commission or the Secretary. Moreover, the area of administrative authority does not appear to be particularly focused on competitive considerations; there is no express provision in the Act directing administrative officials to consider the policies of the antitrust
laws in carrying out their duties and there is no other indication that Congress intended
the adjudicative authority given the Commission and the Secretary to be a complete
substitute for judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws." 409 U.S. at 302-03 n.13 (citations omitted).
105. As will be demonstrated, schemes of industrial self-regulation by their very
nature imply less than rigorous agency supervision. The antitrust function in such cases
clearly remains in the judiciary. See notes 64 supra & 211 infra.
106. See cases cited note 153 infra.
107. 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
108. The utilities industry has been said to be even more highly regulated than
the banking industry discussed subsequently. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 390 n.7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This
extensive control probably arises largely from the rate regulation to which industries
such as utilities and transportation are subject. But see note 139 infra.
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standard. 0 9 It then proceeded to emphasize that the FPC was powerless to provide remedial relief under section 11 of the Clayton Act,"'
while other agencies had in fact been granted that power."' Because
a complainant could therefore find adequate relief for alleged antitrust
violations only in a separate civil action, no congressional intent to displace the antitrust laws, the Court said, could be implied from the
Natural Gas Act." 2 Thus, on the basis of Californiav. Federal Power
Commission, the determination of whether administrative remedial
power is in fact commensurate with that of the judiciary under the Sherman or Clayton Acts is clearly relevant to any pervasiveness inquiry."'
The Court's next occasion to consider the antitrust immunity of
the public utilities industry came eleven years later with Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States.14 Suit was filed under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, charging the defendant with monopolization of the retail
distribution of electrical power by its refusal to wholesale to independent municipal systems. The defense was based upon the assertion that
implicit in the express authority of the FPC to compel involuntary interconnections of power" 5 is the congressional intent to posit in the FPC
exclusive jurisdiction over utilities. The defendant's contention was that
the commission's refusal to exercise its statutory discretion therefore
barred judicial antitrust action.
The Supreme Court dismissed the immunity claim categorically.
First, FPC discretion to compel involuntary interconnections is governed by a public interest standard only," 6 thus precluding pervasiveness in the regulatory scheme. Second, the legislative history of section 202(b) reveals that Congress rejected a proposed common carrier
provision for mandatory sale of power in favor of an essentially selfregulatory system of voluntary interconnections." 7 It was clear that a
109. 369 U.S. at 485, citing United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 351 (1959).
See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Significantly, the Court held FPC authority to approve mergers by a public interest
standard insufficient to confer immunity despite the fact that the commission had in
fact taken competitive factors into consideration in passing upon the defendants' application.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
111. Specifically, section 11 vests authority to enforce compliance with section 7
in the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Trade Commission.
Id.
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-17w (1970).
113. Cf. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
114. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1970).
116. Id.
117. 410 U.S. 366, 373-74 (1973), citing S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
19-20, 48-49 (1935), and H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935).
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scheme "governed in the first instance by business judgment and not
regulatory coercion" was not intended to insulate the utilities from antitrust proceedings, the Court declared;1 1 no flexible scheme of selfregulation in which agency involvement is de minimus could be said
to be incompatible with antitrust enforcement. Finally, the defendant
argued that as municipalities increasingly opted for independent power
systems, commercial power companies would be unable to service their
customers properly without protection from antitrust actions. The
Court held that the burden on power companies was insufficient to outweigh the anticompetitive effect of an antitrust immunity: "The promotion of self-interest alone does not immunize otherwise illegal
conduct.""' 9
This orthodox scrutiny of the regulatory scheme of the Federal
Power Act was, of course, properly directed and resolved by the traditional indicia of the immunity doctrine. But the lesson of Otter Tail
only begins with the majority opinion; the dissent in the four-to-three
decision is equally significant as the ghost of NASD immunity yet to
come. 120 The dissent would have allowed the defense of "business justification," for example, on the grounds that "the health of power companies and the abundance of our energy supply were considerations central to the congressional purpose in devising the regulatory
scheme,' 212 and that as a vertically integrated retailer of power, Otter
Tail "asserted a legitimate business interest in keeping its lines free for
its own power sales and in refusing to lend a hand in its own demise by
wheeling cheaper power from the Bureau of Reclamation to municipal
might otherwise purchase power at retail from Otter
consumers which
22
itself.'
Tail
Nor was business self-interest the sole justification; the dissent
thought that the antitrust laws could not be "blindly applied to. . .unilateral refusals to deal" by utilities which "operate in a regime of rate
regulation and licensed monopolies."' 2 3 If this is not an assertion that
118. 410 U.S. at 374. This stated rationale represents the first articulation of the
Court's implicit differentiation, for purposes of antitrust exemption, between participatory, self-regulatory schemes on the one hand and supervisory regulation on the other.
119. 410 U.S. at 380, citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 375 (1967).
120. Indeed, had Justice Powell, who authored the NASD decision, taken part in
Otter Tail, the inevitable shift in the Court's application of the immunity doctrine might
well have come in 1973 rather than in 1975.
121. 410 U.S. at 389. But see the majority opinion: "Congress, in passing the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, which included Part 11 of the Federal Power Act,
was concerned with 'restraint of free and independent competition' among public utility
holding companies." Id. at 374, citing 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (2) (1970).
122. 410 U.S. at 388.
123. Id. at 389.
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rate regulation alone constitutes exemptive pervasiveness, it comes
perilously close to it. 1 24 But one last rationale for exemption was also
proffered by the dissent:
With respect to decisions by regulated electric utilities as to
whether or not to provide nonretail services . . . in the absence
of horizontal conspiracy, the teaching of the "primary jurisdiction"
cases argues for leaving governmental regulation to the Commission
sensitive and less specifically expert
instead of the invariably less1 25
process of antitrust litigation.
Why the dissent chose to consider vertical integration determinative, 26 to promote primary jurisdiction as a basis for antitrust immunity,
and to defer to the clientele of regulatory agencies the power to effect
decisions intimately affecting market control is not readily apparent.
The long history of the implied immunity doctrine contravenes such
wholesale regulative usurpation of antitrust law and policy. But perhaps the dissent was simply trying to prepare the antitrust bar for the
NASD decision.
Regulation of Banking
The conclusions compelled by the banking cases,' 2 7 however, are
perhaps the most enlightening with respect to the parameters of the
antitrust immunity doctrine. Because these cases involve an industry
generally more highly regulated than the exchanges, as well as an anticompetitive standard of regulative review and an act of Congress designed to shift antitrust jurisdiction largely from the judicial to the regulatory arena, 2 " the banking cases probably represent the most compelling circumstances in which antitrust exemptions were nonetheless
denied.
Decided in the same year as Silver and fully as influential, United
State v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank'29 was the first of the trilogy of
bank merger suits arising under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 13 0 The
124. While the administrative power to fix rates within a given industry has been
considered a factor in determining regulatory pervasiveness, it has never been raised
to prima facie status. Cf. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
296 (1963); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
125. 410 U.S. at 391.
126. No court had hitherto considered the distinction between vertical and horizontal integration to be relevant, much less determinative.
127. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v.
First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 323 (1963).

128.
1974).

See the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970 & Supp. IV,

129.

374 U.S. 321 (1963).

130.

15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
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proposed merger of two Philadelphia banks1 3 1 had been approved by the
Comptroller of the Currency as required by the Bank Merger Act of
1960,132 which in turn had required the comptroller to solicit reports
from the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 'or both, as well as the attorney general, as to the probable anticompetitive effects of any proposed merger. Despite these agencies
opinions that the PhiladelphiaNational Bank merger was substantially
anticompetitive, the comptroller authorized it, and the United States
subsequently filed suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court
rejected defendants' claim that an antitrust exemption barred the action.
First, the comptroller's approval was held insufficient grounds for
antitrust shelter because, although admittedly required to consider a
merger's effect upon competition, the comptroller in fact "was not required to give this factor any particular weight."'' 3 3 This, of course,
goes theoretically far beyond those cases which denied immunity for
want of any antitrust standard of agency review; under Philadelphia
National Bank, even when present, such a standard apparently must
be actively and affirmatively applied to ensure full exercise of the -antitrust function and thereby justify exemption.
The Court also rejected defendants' claim that the high degree of
regulation in commercial banking necessarily evinced a congressional
intent to create a pervasive regulatory scheme:
The fact that the banking agencies maintain a close surveillance
of the industry with a view toward preventing unsound practices
that might impair liquidity or lead to insolvency does not make federal banking regulation all pervasive.. .. 134
After PhiladelphiaNational Bank, then, the showing of pervasiveness
Although the banking
apparently must be a very strong one indeed.
industry operates within a broad network of state and federal regulation, 13 the Court nonetheless refused to hold regulation of the industry "so comprehensive that enforcement of the antitrust laws would
131. The Court summarized the effects of the proposed merger as follows: "Were
the proposed merger to be consummated, the resulting bank would be the largest in
the four-county area, with (approximately) 36% of the area banks' total assets, 36%
of deposits, and 34% of net loans. It and the second largest ... would have between
them 59% of the total assets, 58% of deposits, and 58% of the net loans, while after
the merger the four largest banks in the area would have 78% of total assets, 77% of
deposits, and 78% of net loans." 374 U.S. at 331 (1963).
132. 12U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
133. 374 U.S. at 351 (1963), citing California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S.
482 (1962). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973)
(Antitrust considerations may be relevant but are not determinative).
134. 374 U.S. at 352 (1963).
135. The Court provides a useful discussion of this network. See Id. at 327-29.
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either be unnecessary in light of the completeness of the regulatory
structure, or disruptive of that structure."' 1 6
The Court's response to defendants' claim that application of
section 7 could only lead to "cutthroat competition" detrimental to the
national economy was a succinct statement that not every claim of special economic circumstances would oust the antitrust laws:
Section 7 does not mandate cutthroat competition in the banking
industry, and does not exclude defenses based on dangers to
liquidity or solvency, if to avert them a merger is necessary. It
does require, however, that the forces of competition be allowed
to operate within the broad framework of governmental regulation
of the industry. The fact that banking is a highly regulated
makes the play of competiindustry critical to the Nation's welfare
137
tion not less important but more so.
The congressional response to PhiladelphiaNational Bank was the
Bank Merger Act of 1966,138 which explicitly incorporated the judicial
antitrust standard into administrative review of merger applications, and
attempted thereby to insulate the comptroller's determinations from
subsequent judicial attack. The approach was two-pronged; the act
first requires the comptroller to apply a Clayton Act standard in reaching his initial decision. 1 39 If the merger should fail that scrutiny, the
comptroller is expressly authorized to balance the anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger against the "convenience and needs of
the community;" a merger would pass muster under this test only if
its statutorily defined benefits "clearly outweighed" its traditionally defined anticompetitive effects. 14 0 In all reviews de novo, for which the
the court shall be
act expressly provides, 4 ' "the standards applied by1 42
identical with" those applied by the banking agencies.
41 3
It became apparent in United States v. First City National Bank'
that the Court saw in the Bank Merger Act of 1966 no real change in
the substantive law. The standard incorporated into the act, declared
the Court, merely established for banks an affirmative defense to-not
a pre-emption of-judicial application of section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 1 44 Nor did the act posit antitrust jurisdiction exclusively in the
136. Id. at 352.
137. Id. at 371-72. The defense to which the Court refers, of course, is the traditional failing company affirmative defense. See id. at 372 n.46.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
the 1966

12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970).
Id.
Id. § 1828(c)(5)(B).
Id. § 1828(c)(7)(A).
Id. § 1828(c)(7)(B).
386 U.S. 361 (1967).
The Court indicated that it viewed the "convenience and needs" standard of
act as a congressional effort to ensure that the failing company doctrine be
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comptroller simply because reviewing courts were to apply the agency's
statutory standard as well. Stating that "the grant of administrative
power to give immunity unless the agency's decision is arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, would be a long step"
in the direction of lightly implying antitrust immunity,1' 5 the Court
emphatically declined to take that step:
Traditionally in antitrust actions involving regulated industries, the
courts have never given presumptive weight to a prior agency decision, for the simple reason that Congress put such suits on a different axis than was familiar in administrative procedure. . ..

A

determination of the effect on competition within the meaning of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act is a familiar judicial task. The area of "the
convenience and needs of the community to be served," now in
focus as part of the defense under the 1966 Act, is related, though
perhaps remotely, to the failing-company doctrine, long known to
the courts in antitrust merger cases. The appraisal of competitive
factors is grist for the antitrust mill. .

.

. We see no problem in

bringing these standards into the area of judicial competence.1 4 6
Although strictly speaking not an implied immunity case, United
States v. Third NationalBank 4 ' is nonetheless noteworthy as reaffirming the principle that judicial deference to agency antitrust determinations has no proper place in civil antitrust actions against banks under
the Bank Merger Act. After the comptroller determined that a merger
placing three banks in control of 97.9 percent of the relevant markets
did not substantially lessen competition in light of "community needs,"
the district court found "substantial evidence" to justify such a determination. The Supreme Court rejected this as an improper scope of
review and reversed on grounds that the findings of the district court
did not sufficiently establish the lack of alternative solutions more beneficial to the public interest than an anticompetitive merger. 148 At least
taken into the anticompetitive calculus of the comptroller and the courts by way of
affirmative defense only. Id. at 369.
145. Id. at 368.
146. Id. at 367, 369-70 (citations omitted).
147. 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
148. The Court pointed out that "The District Court did not ask whether the
Weaver group had made concrete efforts to recruit new management, especially a chief
executive officer, who was needed most. . . . The court made no reference to the possibility that the new owners themselves might have taken active charge of the bank. None
of them was a banker, but their successful predecessor Hackworth had not been one
before becoming president of Nashville Bank. Nor did the court assess the possibility
of a sale to others who might have been willing to face up to the management difficulties over a more extended period. We find nothing in the findings indicating that
a bank with assets of $50,000,000 was simply too small to attract competent management or that the Weaver group, the new owners, were intransigently insisting on unreasonably conservative managerial policies. Indeed, the Weaver group included competent
and experienced men who realized the desirability of improving an unsatisfactory situation. Rather than making serious efforts to do so themselves or to sell to others
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under the Banking Act, then, any determination as to the necessity of

antitrust repeal for the sake of regulatory viability necessarily embraces a
search for alternative solutions to an industry's economic malaise

rather than the impromptu abrogation of the antitrust laws: "[B]efore
a merger injurious to the public interest is approved, a showing must
be made that the gain expected from the merger cannot reasonably be
expected through other means."14' 9
As an amplification of "necessity" useful outside the context of the
Bank Merger Act, however, this requirement does not appear qualitatively different from the Silver "complete incompatibility" requirement.
The availability of alternative solutions, of course, negates complete incompatibility between regulatory and antitrust policies. Third National
Bank thus provides at least some perspective on the implied immunity
doctrine.
Summary: The Evolved Immunity Standard
To summarize briefly the immunity standard as developed by the
Court in the foregoing cases, it is clear that the elements requisite to
exemption from antitrust liability are as follows:
Express Exemption

Specific exemptive clause, narrowly construed, integrated into the
regulatory legislation.' 50
Implied Exemption

Independent judicial analysis1 51 to determine either:

(1) The necessity of antitrust repeal to effectuate regulatory objectives,"' or
who would, they preferred to merge with a competing bank-a step which produced
a profit of $750,000 on a two-month investment of $3,800,000." Id. at 190-92 (footnotes omitted).
149. Id. at 190. Although the Third National Bank case involved suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act, there is of course no reason to believe that the alternatives
factor would not be equally relevant in a Sherman Act analysis.
150. See note 14 supra. As has been shown, statutory language any less specific
will fail to immunize, in light of both the canon of narrow construction and the strong
public and judicial policies in favor of vigorous antitrust enforcement. Compare Federal
Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Pan Am. World Airvays,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369
U.S. 482 (1962); Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458 (1960); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); United States
v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939) with Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659
(1975); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1972).
151. Independent analysis precludes deference to a prior administrative determination. See cases cited note 127 supra.
152. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); and Pan
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(2) The existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme, the primary
indicia of which are:

intent to
(a) legislative history indicating a congressional
53
subordinate antitrust to regulatory policy;
antitrust stan(b) duty to actively enforce a nondiscretionary
54
dard of administrative regulation;

(c) availability of remedial relief under the regulatory scheme
commensurate with that of the antitrust laws. 55

United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers
Thus to United States v. National Association of Securities

Dealers.'56 The case is a factually complex one involving multiple suits
on behalf of both investors and the government, who alleged that certain practices in the distribution of open-end mutual funds securities
were in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 57 Named as defendants were the NASD, certain mutual funds, and dealers, all of
whom claimed express and implied immunity 5 ' on the ground that by
virtue of the regulatory scheme embodied in the Maloney Act 59 and

the Investment Company Act of 1940,160 SEC authority over the mutual funds industry made section 1 of the Sherman Act inapplicable to
the mutual funds industry as a matter of law.
Specifically at issue were companion sections 22(d) and 22(f) of

the Investment Company Act,' 6 ' which authorize, respectively, a uniform public offering price in dealer sales of mutual fund shares and fund

restrictions on their negotiability and transferability. The precise statutory language is important:
Am. World Airways, Inc., 371 U.S. 296 (1963). See also Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control VI: Application of the Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 46 (1962); Pogue, supranote 4.
153. Compare Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296
(1963), with United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
154. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Ricci v.
Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963);
California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369. U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. RCA,
358 U.S. 334 (1958).
155. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963);
and California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
156. 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
158. With respect to the arguably express exemption which could have been profferred, see note 62 supra.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970).
160. Id. H8 80a-1 - 80a-52 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
161. Id. § 80a-22(d), (f).
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22(d) . . . [N]o dealer shall sell [mutual fund shares] to any

person except a dealer, a principal underwriter, or the issuer,
except at 1a62 current public offering price described in the
prospectus.

22(f) No registered open-end company shall restrict the transferability or negotiability of any security of which it is the issuer except in conformity with the statements with respect thereto contained in its registration statement nor in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission
of all of the outstandmay prescribe in the interests of the holders
1 63
ing securities of such investment company.

Plaintiffs made two allegations. The first charged a horizontal combination and conspiracy among members of the NASD and others
with the intent to prevent the growth of a secondary market in mutual
funds. The second attacked various vertical restrictions in the distribution of fund shares as per se illegal resale price maintenance and concerted refusals to deal.'6
162. Id. § 80a-22(d).
163. Id. § 80a-22(f).
164. An exhaustive explication of the intricacies of the mutual funds industry is
clearly beyond the scope of this note. The reader, however, may wish to refer to The
Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 732 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Mutual Fund Survey]; SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, ch. xi, Open-End Investment Companies, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, pt. 4, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); SEcURITIEs AND EXCHANGE COMM'N,
A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); 1
L. Loss, SEcuRmES REGULATION, 402-11 (2d ed. 1961).
It will suffice for these purposes simply to distinguish the secondary and primary
markets in mutual fund shares. Mutual funds are investment companies with 40% of
their assets in the form of securities in other companies. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (a) (1970).
They are distinguished from other forms of investment primarily in being open ended;
i.e., the mutual fund sells an unlimited number of shares and invests the capital in
new securities. The fund, however, must also redeem any of its own securities upon
demand of the holder at a price approximating its proportionate share of the fund's
net asset value at the time of the redemption. Id. § 80a-2(a)(32). Thus, to avoid
the theoretical threat of liquidation through mass redemption, a fund must continually
issue new shares to the investing public.
A mutual fund frequently retains an underwriter to serve as its wholesaler who
in turn retains a number of broker-dealers who sell to the public. When either mutual
funds underwriters or broker-dealers sell to the investing public, they are obliged to
sell at a public offering price, commonly computed by adding to the value the security
represents vis-a-vis the net assets of the mutual funds, a "sales load" (or commission)
by which the underwriters and dealers are compensated. This distribution-redemption
system constitutes the primary market in fund shares.
Trade in mutual funds securities, however, occurs outside the primary market as
well. Dealers, for example, may build up personal inventories and sell to investors
on their own behalf. When so doing they act as statutory "dealers". (When selling
for the underwriter, on the other hand, they act as statutory "brokers." See note 166
infra.) Dealers, moreover, also sell to other dealers and to investors on behalf of
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The NASD attempted to justify its resale price maintenance
scheme at least in part by claiming 0 5 that section 22(d)'s price maintenance mandate for sales by statutory "dealers" applied to broker-dealers acting in their capacity as statutory "brokers" as well as statutory
"dealers." 166 The practical effect of such an interpretation is to preclude transactions in which a broker-dealer acting as an agent rather
than as a principal sells at less than the public offering price. The antitrust ramifications are that if interpreted as embracing brokered as well
as dealer sales, section 22(d) authorizes resale price maintenance in
all sales to all investors. This of course constitutes a per se violation
of the Sherman Act 6 ' unless either expressly authorized by statute or
impliedly exempted by the Court. The various alleged vertical restrictions upon interdealer sales effected by prohibiting broker-dealer transactions with any party other than an investor, likewise constitute per
se violations of the Sherman Act 6 8 absent legislative or judicial exemption.
The holding of the Court was bifurcated. With respect to the
alleged vertical monopolization the Court expressly held that the NASD
interpretation of section 22(d) was overly broad; neither statutory construction 6 9 nor legislative history' 70 could logically bring brokered
other investors. These latter two transactions are secondary market transactions not
expressly subject to the public offering price restriction of section 22(d). It is the sales
price at this secondary market level, then, which was at issue in the NASD case: is
it to be competitive or noncompetitive vis-a-vis the primary market?
It should be noted that the secondary market is to be further distinguished from
the pre-1940 "bootleg" market comprised largely of noncontract broker-dealers at which
section 22(d) was largely aimed.

See SEC

REPORT ON INvsrENT

TRuSTS AND IN-

vns'rMENr COMPAmnES, H.R. Doc. No. 279, pt. 3, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1940) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUST STUMY]; Greene, The Uniform Offering Price of Mutual

Fund Shares Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 37 J. URBAN L. 369, 371
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Greene]; Heffernan & Jorden, Section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940-Its OriginalPurpose and Present Function, 1973 DUKE L.J.
975, 1001 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Heffernan & Jorden].
165. SEC acquiescence in the NASD reading of section 22(d) is implicit by virtue
of its authority under the Maloney Act to oversee the activities of the mutual funds.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b), (e), (h), (j), (k) (1970).
166. The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines a "broker" as a person engaged
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others and
a "dealer" as one engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account. -Id. § 80a-2(a) (6), (11). The broker-dealer is thus a chameleon-like figure
whose status at any given time as broker or dealer is contingent upon the identity of
his principal in a given transaction. See United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers,
422 U.S. 694, 712 n.22, 717-18 (1975).
167. See note 13 supra.
168. Such agreements are concerted refusals to deal, and therefore per se violative
of the Sherman Act. See note 13 supra.
169. 422 U.S. at 713 (1975).
170. Id. at 713-19.
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transactions within its ambit. The various distributive restrictions, however, were held to be authorized by section 22(f) on the rationale that
they had never been disapproved by the SEC:
Together, §§ 22(d) and 22(f) protect the primary distribution
system for mutual-fund securities. Section 22(d), by eliminating
price competition in dealer sales, inhibits the most disruptive factor
in the pre-1940's mutual market and thus assures the maintenance
of a viable sales system. Section 22(f) complements this protection by authorizing the funds and the SEC to deal more flexibly
with other detrimental trading practices by imposing SEC-approved
restrictions on transferability and negotiability. Appellant's limiting interpretation of § 22(f) compromises this flexible mandate,
and cannot be accepted.
• . . By its terms, § 22(f) authorizes properly disclosed restrictions
unless they are inconsistent with SEC rules or regulations. The
provision thus authorizes funds to impose transferability
171 or negotiability restrictions, subject to Commission disapproval.
As if unsure of this rather innovative and apparently express exemption, the Court concluded by stating that implied antitrust repeal was
72 the SEC's "flexible"' 73
necessary in order to avoid "compromising"'
regulatory authority and the objectives of the 1940 Act:
Here, however, Congress has made a judgment that these restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the unique problems
of the mutual-fund industry, and has vested in the SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent they should be
tolerated "in the interests of the holders of all the outstanding securities" of mutual funds.
The SEC, the federal agency responsible for regulating the
conduct of the mutual-fund industry, urges that its authority will
be compromised seriously if these agreements are deemed actionable under the Sherman Act. We agree. There can be no reconciliation of its authority under § 22(f) to permit these and similar
restrictive agreements with the Sherman Act's declaration that they
are illegal per se. In this instance the antitrust laws must give way
Investment Company
if the regulatory
174 scheme established by the
Act is to work.
With respect to the alleged horizontal combination between the
NASD and its members to restrict the growth of a secondary market, 175
the Court simply held with sparse comment that the Investment Com171. Id. at 724-26 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 729-30.
173. Id. at 724-25.
174. Id. at 729-30, citing Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(citations omitted).
175. The alleged horizontal conspiracy was designed to insure that all mutual funds
and their underwriters instituted the vertical restrictions described in the text accompanying notes 165-74 supra. See 422 U.S. 694, 730-3 1, n.42 (1975).
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pany and Maloney Acts created a regulatory scheme sufficiently pervasive to immunize the defendants:
The SEC, in its exercise of authority over [NASD] rules and practices, is charged with protection of the public interest as well as the
interests of shareholders, and it repeatedly has indicated that it
weighs competitive concerns. . . . As the Court previously has
recognized the investiture of such pervasive supervisory authority
in the SEC suggests that Congress intended to lift the ban of170the
Sherman Act from [NASD] activities approved by the SEC.
The Shortcomings of the Case
Four justices dissented in the NASD decision, 77 and not without
reason: for aught that appears, the majority chose to dismiss some
three decades of antitrust immunity precedent in order to chart its own
course for the doctrine. The task at hand is to determine where the
Court's majority radically deviated from its own well-established standard for antitrust immunity and what new standard was applied in its
stead.
No Specific StatutoryExemptive Clause Integrated
into the Regulatory Legislation
It is well to begin by establishing that what was apparently a grant
of express immunity via section 22(f) clearly was not based upon a
''specific statutory exemptive clause" grafted onto the Maloney or Investment Company Acts.17 s The foundation upon which the Court
built its express statutory authorization rationale was, rather, section
22(f)'s qualified prohibition against distributive restrictions. Unfortunately, the Court rode roughshod over precedent to find in that section
the semblance of express statutory immunity. First, unambiguously express exemptive clauses are contained in several regulatory
schemes,' 79 and the Court has traditionally required no less an indication from Congress of its intent to displace the antitrust laws.'8 0 Had
section 22(f) been intended to operate as such a clause vis-h-vis section
176. 422 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis added & citations omitted).
177. Cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
Stewart & Rehnquist, J., dissenting; Blackmun & Powell, J3., abstaining).
.178. The fact that the Court arguably could have relied upon an express exemption
has been addressed, and further discussion of the point would appear unnecessary. See
note 62 supra.
179. See note 14 supra. Cf. Note, Antitrust Immunity of the National Association of Securities Dealers Under the Maloney Act, 14 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 111
(1972). The author maintains that the express exemption of § 78o-3(n) is imprecise
compared to those embodied in other schemes and is therefore probably limited to §
78o-3 (i)and does not immunize activities under the act in general.
180. See text accompanying notes 13-61 supra.
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22(d), certainly it could easily have been similarly drafted. Second,
given the strong judicial disfavor of antitrust repeal, section 22(f)
should have been subject to rigorously narrow construction. 8 ' Contrary to the Court's optimistic reading of section 22(f) as "authorizing"
restrictions in the transferability of shares, for example, the statute is
in fact couched in patently prohibitive terms: "No [fund] shall restrict
... ,"182 This is hardly language of authorization under the rule of
Federal Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines, Inc. 3
Finally, assuming arguendo that section 22(f) does constitute an express, affirmative grant to the SEC of regulative authority to approve or disapprove
industry practices, by no means would such a grant a priori give rise
to an express exemption from liability should those practices run afoul
of the antitrust laws.'
Regulatory authority is clearly circumscribed
by the antitrust laws until an express exemption in the regulatory
scheme dictates otherwise. Nor can NASD by juridical sleight of hand
convincingly make a repealer appear where 22(f) stood before; general discretionary agency supervision has never been held sufficient
even to imply immunity, 8 5 and the notion that it can give rise to an
express exemption is an innovative one indeed.
No Necessity of Antitrust Repeal To Effectuate Regulatory Objectives
As if aware of the foregoing gaps in its apparently express
immunity rationale, the majority undertook to establish a purely implied immunity justification for defendants' alleged vertical monopolization. That undertaking unfortunately can only be said to have been
abortive: the Silver'8 6 test of incompatibility between the objectives of
mutual funds regulation and the enforcement of the antitrust laws sufficient in degree to necessitate repeal of the latter was not demonstrated.
As was stated earlier, a detailed analysis of the mutual funds
industry is beyond the scope of this note.8 s17 Yet the question whether
resale price maintenance and vertical fund restrictions are necessary to
effectuate the objectives of the mutual funds regulatory scheme requires a rudimentary examination of both the mechanics of fund distri181. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v.Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726
(1973).
182. 15 U.S.C. 80a-22(f) (1970).
183. 411 U.S. 726 (1973). See text accompanying note 61 supra.

184. The argument that itdoes, of course, echoes defendants' contention inthe
vast majority of the implied exemption cases, that an express statutory grant of a purely
general supervisorial authority exempts all industry activity from antitrust attack. This
position has been roundly and uniformly rejected. See text accompanying notes 63145 supra.
185. See note 154 &accompanying text supra.
186. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
187. But see note 164 supra.
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bution and the role of sections 22(d) and (f) of the Investment Company Act with respect to that system.
As open-end investment companies, the mutual funds are distinguished by the continuous unlimited distribution and compulsory
redemption of shares.' 8 The relationship of these two characteristics
is symbiotic. Because liquidation via mass redemption is at least theoretically a constant threat,8 9 the most effective prophylactic is the continuous sale and distribution of new fund shares. 9 ' An orderly market
for their distribution is thus the sine qua non of the industry.
The Investment Company Act of 1940, and section 22(d) of that
act in particular, was passed expressly to ensure an orderly distributionredemption market by eliminating certain disruptive trading abuses
which had flourished under the pre-1940 "backward pricing" system.
Briefly stated, backward pricing simply means that a fund's net asset
value, which fluctuates constantly, was computed once daily at the close
of exchange trading. This valuation did not go into effect until the
opening of the exchange the following morning. In the interim period,
therefore, two prices were ascertainable: the security price for the current day and the security price for the next day. During the late hours
of the current day, after the following day's price was known, an insider
could buy and sell completely without risk.
This backward pricing system was exploited principally by two
groups: "bootleg" dealers not under contract with a mutual fund or
underwriter, who could purchase and sell without paying a sales load,
and a secondary market of contract underwriters and their broker-dealers, who by maintaining an inventory position could enjoy virtually
riskless trading. With an inventory, for example, a dealer in a rising
market could fill today's expensive orders with yesterday's cheaper
securities, retaining the profits for himself. Conversely, in a falling market, he could fill today's expensive orders with tomorrow's cheaper
securities.' 9 ' In addition to yielding windfall profits to dealers the
abuses engendered by backward pricing diluted the value of outstand188. See note 164 supra. See United States v. National Ass'n of See. Dealers,
Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 697-99 (1975); Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to
the Securities Field, 16 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 131, 154-55 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Nerenberg]; Mutual FundsSurvey, supra note 164.
189. See Mutual FundsSurvey, supra note 164, at 834-35.
190. The industry itself sees continual distribution as the inevitable "byproduct of
redeemability": "The inexorable law of this business is that when assets rise, redemptions rise proportionately so the more you succeed, the harder you have to sell, just
to keep your place on the treadmill." SECURrIms AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, SEC REPORT
ON PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GRowTH, H.R. REp. No.
2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1966) hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENT].
191. See INVEWMBNT TRUST STUDY, supra note 164, at 851-52; Heffernan &Jorden,
supra note 164, at 979-84; Greene, supra note 164, at 371-73.
Public investors, of course, generally could not take advantage of this system, sim-
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ing shareholders' securities.' 9 2
To the extent that section 22 of the Investment Company Act was
enacted to curb these abuses and thereby protect the primary distributive market, 1 93 that section of the act could arguably be interpreted as
having an anticompetitive regulatory objective. On the other hand,
simply because its purpose was to ensure the orderly distribution and
redemption of mutual fund shares by eliminating dilutive in-out trading
and bootleg price competition, it does not follow that the underlying
regulatory objective was to eliminate competition categorically in the
market for mutual funds.
[T]he requirement of a uniform sales load was a compromise
provision designed primarily as a device to curb abuses resulting
in dilution of the value of mutual fund shares and, possibly, to
impose some limitations on the activities of "non-contract" dealers.
Only incidentally, and as a natural consequence of its operation,
did the section entail the "price-fixing" aspects which are now
assumed by many to be its raison d'etre....
Thus appears the real beginning of what became section 22,
including the foundation and rationale for a provision such as
22(d), which would require a sales load to be imposed on all sales.
The sales load requirement was imposed primarily as a deterrent
to the value-diluting in-out transactions and "riskless trading" encouraged by the backward pricing system. The "price fixing"
consequences entailed by
the enactment were mere by-products
94
of the essential scheme.1
Thus, no per se anticompetitive objective should be assumed to
underlie section 22 of the regulatory scheme embodied in the 1940 Investment Company Act.19 5 Assuming that the primary purpose of
ply because daily price fluctuations-even had they been a matter of common knowledge
-were generally too small to yield a profit over and above the required sales load.
See INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 164, at 862; Heffernan & Jorden, supra note
164, at 980 n.20.
192. See INvEsTmFr TRusr STrUY, supra note 164, at 865-66; Heffernan &Jorden,
supra note 164, at 983-84. "The dilution referred to resulted from the reduction in
value of existing shareholders' pro-rata interest in the fund arising as a natural consequence of backward pricing in a rising market. For example, if yesterday there were
10 shares outstanding and $100 in the fund, and today the fund is worth $110, one
who purchases today under the backward pricing system would pay $10 per share rather
than $11 (which represents the existing shareholders' pro-rata interest in the $110 fund).
Thus, the $10 increase in the fund's value will be diluted to the extent that today's
purchaser is permitted to share in that increase by buying at yesterday's price." Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 164, at 983-84.
193. See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694
(1975); Greene, supra note 164, at 371; Nerenberg, supra note 188, at 155; Mutual
Fund Survey, supra note 164, at 838.
194. Heffeman &Jorden, supra note 164, at 978, 990 (emphasis added).
195. The legislative history and purposes of the 1940 act in this regard should
be compared to that of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 &
Supp. IV, 1974), which represents an intentionally anticompetitive regulatory objective.
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section 22 was in fact to prevent the dilution of outstanding shareholders' securities, there would therefore appear to be no regulatory
objective of the 1940 act was to ensure that there would be but one
market otherwise free of opportunities for dilutive abuses. Or alternatively assuming that its main function was simply to insure a generally
orderly distributive system, it is still not apparent from the rather superficial economic analysis in NASD that such an orderly system could not
in fact accommodate secondary market transactions. The majority's
error in this regard appears to lie largely in its implicit assumption that
pre-1940 abuses can still exist in the post-1940 market and that the
objective of the 1940 act was to insure that there would be but one
market for the exchange of mutual fund shares. The second assumption appears to be unwarranted by the legislative history of the act, and
if the first is in fact justified, the majority nonetheless failed in its duty
to demonstrate as much. 1 6 It follows that if an orderly system of fund
distribution can embrace a competitive secondary market, then clearly
no implied repeal is necessary in the Silver sense, 19 7 and an antitrust
action against the NASD is not incompatible with the regulatory objectives of section 22.
The NASD majority, however, also sought to establish necessity in
another, more theoretical sense: if the "flexible mandate"1 8 granted
the SEC to regulate distributive restriction under section 22(f) would
be "compromised" 9 by an antitrust attack upon those restrictions,
repeal is impliedly necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme.
Twenty years of precedent for the implied immunity doctrine, however,
have established that necessity and administrative flexibility are inversely, not directly, related: the more discretionary the agency supervision, the more self-regulatory the scheme; the greater the degree of
self-regulation, the greater the need for judicial antitrust scrutiny.2 00 The
holding that implied repeal was necessary to effectuate a largely discretionary, ambiguous congressional mandate to the SEC therefore
clearly does violence to the strong presumption in favor of vigorous
antitrust enforcement.
196. See text accompanying note 146 supra. As the Court itself recognized, the
dilutive effect of unscrupulous broker-dealer practices, for example, is now precluded
by the forward pricing system established in 1968. 422 U.S. 694, 710 n.19 (1975);
see Investment Company Act Release No. 5519 (1968) [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH FaD. SEc. L REP. 77,616; 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (1974). The necessity for section 22(d) as an anti-dilution bulwark, therefore, is clearly a thing of the past.
197. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
198. 422 U.S. 694, at 725.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See
text accompanying note 145 supra.
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From another perspective, it is rudimentary that complete
incompatibility can exist only between two equally strong public policies. Where one of two conflicting policies is flexible, on the other
hand, reconciliation is a simple matter of subordination; no complete
incompatibility in the Silver sense exists.20 1 Such was certainly the case
in NASD, and the majority opinion found incompatibility only by overlooking the possibility of reconciling antitrust enforcement with the
regulatory scheme. This, of course, Silver forbids, and the NASD court
was cavalier at best in its manipulation of the Silver necessity and incompatibility doctrines.
No Pervasive Regulatory Scheme
While it is apparent from the foregoing discussion that necessity
is perhaps as much an economic as a juridical issue,2" 2 pervasiveness,
on the other hand, is a uniquely judicial construct well defined by
precedent. And, as will be shown, the regulatory scheme of the mutual
funds industry simply does not fit within the precedential definition; the
traditional indicia are lacking.
No Legislative History Indicating a Congressional Intent
To Subordinate Antitrust to Regulatory Policy
Inasmuch as implied immunity is based upon a presumed
congressional intent to subordinate antitrust policy to the objectives of
a regulatory scheme-indeed to repeal the antitrust laws insofar as they
frustrate regulatory objectives 2 3 -the legislative history of the Investment Company and Maloney Acts is most enlightening: it clearly
reveals the intent to create a largely self-regulatory scheme for the
NASD. Such a scheme of course belies any presumed intent to repeal
the antitrust laws with respect to mutual funds.
204
While the legislative history of sections 22(d) and (f) is sparse,
at least one fact of the history is both clear and probative. The original
201. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
202. It bears repeating, however, that this fact does not preclude an ultimate, purely
judicial scrutiny of the economic analyses proferred in justification for subordinating
the strong public policy in favor of antitrust enforcement. Indeed, the implied immunity
doctrine clearly requires it, in order to determine incompatibility. See text accompanying notes 239-50, infra. It is submitted that it is in large part the failure of the NASD
majority to subject the distributive restrictions of section 22(f) to that scrutiny which
belies the validity of its ultimate holding.
203. See generally Pogue, supra note 4. See text accompanying notes 16 & 63-65
supra.
204. See Greene, supra note 164, at 371; Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 164, at
977; Simpson & Hodes, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uniform Price
Maintenance Provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW.
718 (1969).
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version of the remedial bill introduced to Congress20 5 was the offspring
of the SEC's Investment Trust Study, and contained no provision resembling the present sections 22(d) or (f). The significance of the original version of the bill lies in the fact that it would have both granted
the SEC power to eliminate backward pricing 2 6 and would have precluded any scheme of industry self-regulation.20 7 The regulatory function of the SEC became, however, increasingly passive as the statute
evolved. Originally, the SEC's role was to actively promulgate rules
to serve "the public interest and the protection of investors," including
rules prohibiting restrictions on the distribution of shares.20 8 Section
22(f) as enacted now limits the SEC's rulemaking authority to passive
oversight to protect the "interests of the holders of all of the outstanding
securities ...
.
Nor did the NASD majority fail to note this distinctly self-regulatory congressional bent:
The compromise provision, which subsequently was enacted into
law. . . manifested a more positive attitude toward self regulation.
. . . Viewed in this historical context, the statute reflects a clear
congressional determination that, subject to Commission oversight,
mutual funds should be allowed to retain the initiative in dealing
with the potentially adverse effects of disruptive trading practices.
The Commission repeatedly has recognized the role of private
agreements
210 in the control of trading practices in the mutual-fund
industry.
With this recognition, however, should have come the realization
that such a legislative history only negates any presumption that Congress intended to supplant the antitrust laws. First, self-regulatory
schemes by their very nature mandate increased, external "policy-type"
antitrust scrutiny to control anticompetitive abuses which could otherwise cloak themselves in the guise of regulative prerogative. Congress
must be presumed to have intended that natural competition should
safeguard industry practices in such cases; otherwise the regulation
211
would have been made more stringent, i.e., more "participatory.
205. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
206. See Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 164, at 986.
207. Id.
208. See S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 22(d)(2) (1940).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f) (1970). As two commentators noted, "The industry
was wholly opposed to the prospect of forward pricing which could have been (and
probably would have been) established by the SEC pursuant to section 22(a) as originally drafted." Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 164, at 987-88.
210. 422 U.S. at 726-27.
211. See Reconciling Antitrust Law, supra note 64, at 339. Comparing self and
administratively regulated industries, the author states: "'These are two distinct situations that have resulted in two distinct types of regulation. In the first case, regulatory
machinery is designed as a supplement to natural competition, not a substitute for what
competition exists. This type of regulation is found in the banking and agricultural
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Second, and closely related, is the rule established by Otter Tail2 12 that
regulatory schemes governed by private business judgment rather than
2 13
agency coercion are not intended to displace the antitrust function.
In this respect it is germane to note that the legislative history of the
provision of the Federal Power Act at issue in Otter Tail is virtually
identical to that of sections 22(d) and (f) of the Investment Company
Act.2 14 In each case Congress abandoned proposals for affirmative
regulatory supervision in favor of self-regulatory schemes. The Otter
Tail Court saw in such history a clear congressional rejection of pervasive regulation and an unambiguous intent that utilities should remain
subject to the antitrust laws.2 15 That a less stringently regulated industry such as mutual funds should have received more liberal treatment
simply is not sound law. Worse, it is pernicious precedent.
industries, for example, and it is also the type of scheme embodied in the Maloney
Act. The second type of regulation is found in the pervasive statutes governing the
transportation industries and public utilities. The natural monopoly situation present
in these industries compels direct government participation in rate-making and serviceallocation decisions. The first type of regulation is more supervisory or policing in
nature; the second type is more participatory. This distinction is significant for purposes
of construing statutory language when a court attempts to determine the extent of antitrust immunity required to accomplish Congress' purposes. The second type, or "participatory regulation," requires broader antitrust exemptions than the first type, or "supervisory regulation." A participatory-type regulated industry may fix prices because the
government agency is involved in the process. A supervisory-type regulated industry
may adopt rules for disciplining members if they do not meet group norms of honesty
and fair dealing because direct government regulation may not be feasible. But it may
not fix prices, since the government agency is not directly involved in this process. There
is no provision for that kind of involvement in the act of Congress. While the court retains jurisdiction over antitrust matters in both types of regulatory schemes, the niche
that is cut out of the national policy favoring competition is much broader for participatory-type regulated industries than for supervisory-type regulated industries." Another
commentator has said: "Whether the antitrust laws apply, some government oversight is
warranted, indeed necessary to insure that action in the name of self-regulation is neither
discriminatory nor capricious." Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49
A.B.A.J. 244, 246 (1963). Another points out: "Self regulation is vulnerable to the per
se theory of antitrust liability because of the many concerted activities which are carried
on by the self-policing agencies and because of the intrinsic anticompetitive bias recognized in the concept of self-regulation. . . . Although there are built-in anticompetitive
effects in the self-regulatory concept, there is nothing .. .which directly performs the
antitrust function of guarding against the misuse of the delegated power of self-regulation [absent an antitrust standard of agency review]. It is universally conceded that
some form of government oversight and review of the self-policing efforts of the selfregulatory agencies is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the securities laws as well
as the antitrust laws." Nerenberg, supra note 188, at 157. See also 2 L. Loss, SEcuRIrrEs REGULATION 1361 (2d ed. 1961).
212. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
213. Id. at 375. The NASD majority, it will be recalled, emphasized "the significant
role of private agreements" in industry self-regulation.
214. Id. at 372-75.
215. Id.at 374.
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No Duty To Actively Enforce a Nondiscretionary
Antitrust Standard of Administrative Review

As has been shown, in order for implied immunity from the
antitrust laws to be found on the basis of pervasive regulation, the
supervising agency must govern its clientele by strict antitrust standards.
And yet SEC supervisorial power under section 22(f) is confined to
protecting only "the interests of the holders of outstanding securities." 216 The majority's characterization of such a standard as sufficient
to serve the antitrust function defies precedent which has uniformly
held even the more comprehensive "public interest" standard wholly
inadequate in this regard.2 17 Nor does the fact that the SEC "repeatedly has indicated that it weights competitive concerns in the exercise
of its continued supervisory responsibility" 218 buttress the majority's
pervasiveness rationale. Discretion cannot suffice for duty in this
respect; otherwise, the antitrust function is at the mercy of administrative inclination rather than compulsion. The Court in Philadelphia
National Bank 19 and Otter Tail22 0 made that much emphatically clear.
This is true especially in light of the SEC's arguably deferential relationship with respect to NASD self-regulation. 221 The majority's state-

ments, for example, that "commission acceptance of fund-initiated
restrictions for more than three decades hardly represents an abdication of its regulatory responsibilities,"2 22 and its reliance upon "the

SEC's election not to initiate restrictive rules or regulations" as "precisely the kind of administrative oversight of private practices"22 3 that
216. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(f). It is arguable that the scheme of the Maloney Act
is more pervasive than that of the Investment Company Act; § 78o-3 (b) (8), for exampIe, does forbid restriction of membership and mandates that NASD rules must safeguard "against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other
charges, and. . . remove impediments to...
the mechanism of a free and open market .

. . ."

Nonetheless, the NASD majority based its finding of pervasiveness upon

the ultimate regulatory authority of the SEC. Thus, the opinion's grant of immunity
is ultimately founded upon an inadequate less-than-public-interest standard.
217. See text accompanying note 250 infra.
218. 422 U.S. 694, 732 (1975).
219. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
220. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
221. The power of the SEC under section 22(f), for example, is presently discretionary; when the original version of S. 3580 was introduced to provide for active SEC
supervision, the commission acquiesced in association demands for a less intrusive SEC
role. Heffernan & Jorden, supra note 164, at 986-98. Criticism of a history of allegedly
lax supervision of the New York Stock Exchange has likewise been levelled at the commission, and concern expressed that that history reflects a general indifference in the
agency with respect to antitrust matters. See Reconciling Antitrust Law, supra note
64, at 292-97. Entrusting antitrust supervision to the SEC alone would thus appear,
on the basis of past experience, rather like assigning Rip Van Winkle the nightwatch.
222. 422 U.S. 694, 728 (1975).
223. Id.
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can immunize would, if taken at face value, eviscerate the passive
non-disapproval rule of Otter Tail." 4 Contrary to the conclusions of
the NASD majority, however, pervasiveness has always been a question
of rigor, not breadth, and the notion that nondisapproval amounts to
immunity has never been accepted as valid.
Thus, there is neither an antitrust standard of review, nor a
present duty to consider anticompetitive factors, nor a past history of
active antitrust enforcement2' 25 sufficient to justify the majority's finding
of pervasiveness in the regulation of mutual funds. The veto power
of the SEC under section 22(f), upon which the opinion predicates its
grant of exemption, should never have conferred antitrust immunity
without a showing that SEC approval was governed by a mandatory
antitrust standard. Even where such a standard has been integrated
into a given regulatory regime, the judicial preference for vigorous antitrust enforcement has nonetheless defeated implied immunity.2 2 6 Certainly, therefore, the SEC's passive failure to disapprove-as was the
case in NASD---does not logically justify an exemption.
No Remedial Relief Available Under the Regulatory Scheme
Commensurate with that of the Antitrust Laws
It is apparent that repeal of the antitrust laws also repeals the
remedies they provide an injured party. Any implied regulatory displacement of the antitrust laws, therefore, must be shown to be accompanied by an alternate, regulatory means of remedial relief. 227 Otherwise, a gap in the surrogate scheme exists which Congress can only
have intended the antitrust laws to fill, and such gaps, of course, preclude pervasiveness.
The Maloney Act provides for an essentially insular grievance
procedure. A competitively aggrieved party, for example,2 -8 could
only demand that the SEC abrogate the allegedly offensive NASD
rule, 229 or that the NASD revoke the guilty parties' membership, or
impose various fines.25 0 Should the SEC refuse to take action, judicial
224. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
225. But see the Multiple Trading Case, which involved the NYSE, not the NASD.
See Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
226. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726
(1973); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States
v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959). See note 127 supra.
227. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); California
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (b) (8) (1970) probably represents the most reasonable facsimile of a built-in statutory antitrust standard under which a competitively injured party
would complain.
229. Id. § 78o-3(k)(1).
230. Id. § 78o-3(b)(9).
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review is available, 1 1 but this intra-agency remedial scheme compares
with those expressly found inadequate in the Borden2 3 and Federal
Power Commission 3 3 cases. Having included no provisions for remedies commensurate with those available in an antitrust suit, the Borden
and Federal Power Commission regulatory schemes were flatly held to
be no complete surrogate for civil antitrust enforcement. The fact that
the CAB was empowered to enforce section 7 of the Clayton Act, on
the other hand, was a decisive factor in the Pan American Court's
willingness to declare that particular scheme to be pervasive. 23 4 Given
that Congress has similarly empowered the ICC, FCC, FTC, and Federal Reserve Board,2 35 its failure to do so with respect to the SEC would
clearly appear to negate any intent on its part to invest antitrust enforcement exclusively in the commission.
Nor are the sanctions available under the act comparable with the
treble damages available in a civil suit. Section 78o-3 (b) (9), for example, limits NASD sanctions of members to discipline "by expulsion,
suspension, fines, censure. . . or any other fitting penalty, for any violation of its rules. ' 238 With respect to alleged violations by the NASD
itself, the available remedies are commission abrogation or amendment
of the rule at issue 2 3 r and suspension of the NASD or its members. 238
It is thus apparent that any effective relief in the form of damages
for mutual funds' violation of the antitrust laws must be sought in the
courts; no such relief can be granted by the SEC. A regulatory scheme
cannot be said to be a congressionally intended surrogate for the
antitrust laws which includes no congressionally established antitrust
remedies.
No Independent JudicialAnalysis
The doctrine of implied immunity, as a mitigating principle of a
231. See generally Reconciling Antitrust Law, supra note 64, at 290.
232. 'United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). "That this provision of
the Capper-Volstead Act does not cover the entire field of the Sherman Act is sufficiently clear. The Sherman Act authorizes criminal prosecutions and penalties. The
Capper-Volstead Act provides only for a civil proceeding." Id. at 206.
233. California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 486 (1962). "If existing
natural gas companies violate the antitrust laws, the [Federal Power] Commission is
advised by § 20(a) to 'transmit such evidence' to the Attorney General 'who, in his
discretion, may institute the necessary criminal proceedings.' Other administrative agencies are authorized to enforce § 7 of the Clayton Act... but the Federal Power Commission is not included in the list." Id. at 486.
234. See Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 304 (1963).
235. Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (b) (9) (1970). The violations actionable are of "its rules,"
not the antitrust laws.
237. Id. §§78o-3(k)(1)-(2).
238. Id. § 78-3(1).
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nonetheless vigorous antitrust policy,2" 9 has been girded by increasingly
stringent application of the principle that no implied exemption should
be based upon anything less than an independent, judicial finding of
compelling countervailing regulatory objectives, and the principle that
240
a prior administrative determination does not suffice in this regard.
2
4
First articulated in United States v. RCA, ' firmly established by the
banking cases, 2 42 and ultimately unquestioned as a principle of antitrust
law in Otter Tail Power Company v. United States,243 prior administrative determinations of antitrust matters need not necessarily be accorded
weight in judicial antitrust proceedings. Even administrative findings
of fact in an area of admitted agency expertise had been held to make
no more than a "meaningful contribution" in ultimate antitrust
adjudication.

244

The Court in NASD therefore belied its own precedent in according "considerable weight" to the SEC's own interpretation of section
22(f). 45 In so doing, it abdicated its assigned role as the ultimate
arbiter of necessity to an administrative usurper neither required to
consider antitrust policy nor to accord it the preferential weight which
precedent requires.2 4 6 Indeed, the stance of the Court is perhaps best
described as deferential:
[Under section 22(f)], however, Congress has made a judgment
that these restrictions on competition might be necessitated by the
unique problems of the mutual-fund industry, and has vested in the
SEC final authority to determine whether and to what extent they
239. Note, Antitrust Laws and the Securities Exchange, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 100,
104 n.26 (1971).
240. Indeed, this was the express conclusion of a segment of the Attorney General's
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws as early as 1955. The group stated: "In
the absence of express antitrust exemption, Congress did not intend that administrative
agencies should, in all cases, be the sole forum for determination of antitrust questions
stemming from conduct subject to their jurisdiction. This is especially so . . . since
it is by no means clear that the courts will closely scrutinize agency determinations
of the weight given to factors in evaluating 'public interest' . . . . Even where [administrative] approval occurs, it is clearly a proper subject for judicial scrutiny to determine whether or not the agency has accorded whatever Congressionally intended weight

to promotion of competition the particular statute requires." REPORT OF THE ATroRNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDy THE ANTITRUST LAws 283-84 (1955).
241. 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
242. See note 127 supra. The fact that the 1966 Bank Merger Act specifically
required review de novo was not crucial to its approach; the provision was referred
to as a factor simply additional to the traditional rule of reason approach built into
Clayton Act review.
243. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
244. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973).
245. 422 U.S. 694, 725 (1975).
246. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 323 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
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should be tolerated "in the interests24of
7 the holders of all the outstandingsecurities" of mutual funds.
Congressional judgments, of course, are found largely in the eye
of the juridical beholder. The "unique problems" of the banking industry presented the Court with no difficulty in the Philadelphia
National Bank, First City National Bank and Third National Bank
cases. 248 "Final authority," moreover, with respect to antitrust matters
can scarcely be vested in an administrative tribunal by virtue of a noncompetitive standard of review.24 9 And finally, the "interests of holders of all the outstanding securities" as an alternate standard is clearly
a qualitatively lower one for insuring antitrust consideration than
the "public interest" and "convenience" standards uniformly held inadequate in each and every case in which the contention was made that
those standards could oust the antitrust laws. 250 Therefore, while SEC
expertise is a vital resource for the antitrust court, its section 22(f)
imprimatur should not be conclusive. The Court in NASD would
better have assumed the independent stance it maintained in the banking cases; its conclusions might have been the same, but perhaps they
would have been more convincing.
Conclusion: NASD and the Future of the
Antitrust Immunity Doctrine
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the NASD decision
represents a singularly adamant refusal by a majority of the Court to
adhere to its own clearly defined criteria for antitrust immunitycriteria just as adamantly reaffirmed as recently as 1973. If correct,
however, any such analysis only begs the question: Is NASD evolution, or mere aberration, in the doctrine of antitrust immunity? A conclusion should be drawn. The antitrust bar must know whether the
decision is a mere precedential bastard on the one hand, or the legitimate offspring of a new judicial union on the other; otherwise, whether
247. 422 U.S. at 729 (emphasis added).
248. See text accompanying notes 127-49 and especially the text accompanying note
146 supra.
249. See note 66 supra. Assuming that the Court adopted a deferential stance
with respect to the SEC, as the dissent properly points out, the SEC has in fact made
no determinations with respect to many of the particular practices alleged and indeed
has considered amending the NASD rules to prohibit the same group boycott and price
maintenance practices under attack. 422 U.S. at 746, 748 (White, J., dissenting).
250. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726 (1973); Otter
Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. First City
Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967); United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361
(1967); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369
U.S. 482 (1962); United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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the antitrust laws will be henceforth preempted by public interest regulatory standards will be forever in doubt.
There appear to be three possible interpretations of the impact
of the decision upon the traditional doctrine of antitrust immunity. The
first is that the majority chose to reject the traditionally stringent standard with respect to the mutual funds industry exclusively, and in fact
intended no blanket, multi-industry extension of the doctrine at all. In
light of the unique characteristics of mutual funds and the theoretical
threat posed by a price-competitive secondary market, the majority
might well have concluded that the bulwark provided by vertical and
horizontal market restrictions was indeed "necessary" under the Silver
test,2 51 and that antitrust vulnerability ultimately would breed economic
chaos. Thus, precedent was subordinated to pragmatism, and the traditional standard was ignored for the sake of economic stability. Such
policy decisions are of course neither unique in judicial history, nor are
they necessarily pernicious.
And yet, if the NASD holding were interpreted as an economic
policy decision strictly confined to the mutual funds industry, it could
not be said to constitute sound law even within those narrow confines.
This is true largely because the Court eschewed an independent economic analysis and thereby rendered an empirically unsound policy
judgment. Of course, even assuming that the SEC's economic analysis
was correct, because the Court so willingly sacrificed the antitrust laws
to economic principles, NASD arguably constitutes an unwarranted
usurpation of a function uniquely legislative: purely policy decisions
with respect to the national economic well-being are properly left to
the expertise of Congress and congressional fact finding committees.
The primary duty of an antitrust court is to safeguard the public policy
embodied in the antitrust laws; to Congress alone belongs the prerogative to wholly preempt those laws for reasons purely economic. The
very fact that it has expressly declined to exercise that prerogative vish-vis the mutual funds industry should have made the Court far more
circumspect about doing so in its stead.
An alternative approach to the decision, however, would be to
classify it as revolutionary; that is, the NASD majority chose to adopt
a new, public interest standard of regulatory review as sufficient ground
for antitrust immunity. Because the NASD opinion so often echoes the
Otter Tail dissent, if this approach is correct, the dissent in Otter
Tail has clearly become the law in NASD, and the death knell for the
established immunity doctrine could as well have been sounded in Otter
Tail.
251.

Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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If the NASD majority in fact intended to foment a revolution,
however, it would appear to have been unsuccessful for reasons purely
practical. While only the legal neophyte would anticipate that the
United States Supreme Court would expressly overrule its own precedent, both bench and bar, on the other hand, may justifiably expect
that the Court's major departures from established doctrine will be
predicated upon a careful re-examination of precedent. While the
Court need not pay deference to precedent in creating new law, it
surely cannot either ignore or misuse it without creating confusion
in the lower courts as to what has, or has not, been declared to
be the law applicable to future cases. In short, the Court cannot pour
new wine into old bottles and expect the bench and bar to recognize
a new vintage from the label.
The NASD decision fails as an effort to create a wholly new standard of immunity for its fundamental weaknesses in this regard. The
Court made but passing reference to its earlier decisions on the immunity doctrine and yet paradoxically took great pains to justify its exemption of the mutual funds industry on traditional grounds of pervasiveness. Admittedly, it had perhaps little choice: as has been demonstrated, the decisions prior to NASD had uniformly held the public
interest standard inadequate to exempt, had stringently required -active
antitrust regulatory scrutiny, without exception had: rejected a deferential stance with respect to prior administrative determinations, had consistently required unambiguously express statutory exemption, and in
dealing with industries peculiarly subject to limited anticompetitive
practices as a matter of functional necessity, had nonetheless strictly
applied the antitrust laws in accord with the weighty public policy in
favor of their general enforcement.
Unfortunately, the only tangible result of the NASD opinion is thus
a purely intangible basis for its finding of pervasiveness. Having failed
either expressly to discard traditional immunity criteria on the one
hand, or to unambiguously promulgate new ones on the other, the
NASD holding is little more than a legal conundrum, and simply cannot
be said to be the stuff of which judicial revolutions are made. It would
not appear unreasonable to predict that the lower courts and the antitrust bar will agree, and that Otter Tail will be generally regarded as
bloodied, but unbowed, by NASD.
The third and probably most accurate interpretation of the NASD
holding is that which is dialectically compelled by the other two: If the
case does not constitute a sound application of the antitrust immunity
doctrine in its own right, and if on the other hand it cannot be said
to reflect the caliber and clarity of judicial reasoning necessary to overrule that doctrine, then the decision must necessarily be adjudged
wrongly decided. Unfortunately, however flawed NASD may be, it
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will not be without some effect upon antitrust law in general and antitrust immunity in particular. Obviously, for example, competition from
an active secondary market in mutual funds is now largely a function
of SEC prerogative. And certainly NASD will not escape the attention
of antitrust counsel representing industries subject to agency regulation
under a public interest standard; defense motions on the basis of regulatory oversight will undoubtedly flood antitrust courts in the wake of
NASD. Worse, agencies' prior determinations with respect to anticompetitive effects of consolidations, mergers, and price-fixing activities
bearing their administrative imprimatur may be accorded inordinate
weight in judicial antitrust proceedings.
It is perhaps the public policy embodied in the antitrust laws,
however, which will ultimately suffer the greatest harm as a result of
the NASD decision. Exemptions from the antitrust laws have always
been strongly disfavored, and implicit in the cavalier treatment accorded them in NASD is a potentially pernicious attitude that the antitrust laws represent mere anachronisms in an economy increasingly
subject to governmental regulation. But to paraphrase what Justice
Douglas so eloquently stated in the Philadelphia National Bank case,
the fact that industries critical to the nation's welfare may be subject
to increasing regulation only makes the play of competition (and the
rigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws necessary to secure it) not
less important, but more so.2" 2
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